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Abstract: This study investigated the relative effectiveness of trade and policy shocks on sectoral output 
growth in a small open Nigerian economy.  It is a country-specific, time series study verifies whether there is 
difference in the effect of sectoral output response to policy shocks in Nigeria. A CVAR model was specified to 
assess the effects of policy shocks on real aggregate and sectoral output measures. The model included oil 
price shock and an interactive term of trade openness as measures of supply and external shocks to the 
economy. The empirical results showed that there was remarkably difference in sectoral output responses to 
policy distortion. The effects of monetary policy shocks were positive and significant on manufacturing, 
service and industrial sector while fiscal policy shock was only significant and positive on agricultural output 
growth.  The result further showed that international oil price shock and trade openness had pronounced 
negative effects on both sectoral and aggregate outputs. In addition, oil and trade openness’ negative effects 
overwhelmed the positive effects of fiscal and monetary policy shocks.  The policy implication of the finding is 
that the effectiveness of domestic macroeconomic policy is constrained by the external shocks from both oil 
price and trade openness. Thus, confirming the open economic version of policy ineffectiveness proposition 
of the New classical macroeconomic in Nigeria 
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1. Introduction 
 
An increasing number of studies had begun to raise issue about the consequences of both oil price and trade 
policy on the effectiveness of domestic effort at mobilizing resource for growth. Ogun and Akinlo (2010) 
established that attempts to use monetary policy to stimulate economic growth through credit mobilization 
had been impaired by the external shock from the trade and financial reform in Nigeria. Similar Olomola and 
Adejumo (2006) also concluded that oil price shock contributed significantly to fluctuation in macroeconomic 
variables in Nigeria. However, little effort, in the previous attempts in Nigeria, was made at analyzing the role 
external shocks from both trade openness and oil price in this circumstance. Perhaps the fact that the 
Nigerian economy is trade and oil dependent makes such analysis exigent. Nigerian industries depend on 
capital and raw material imports while the government finances depend heavily on oil exports. The 
predominance of agricultural employment makes the majority of the people to depend on agricultural export 
earnings and imported manufactured goods to supplement the little that is produced locally. Hence, overall 
external trade policy of government has crucial role in facilitating the smooth running of the economy. 
 
In developed countries research has so far focused on the real effects of aggregate demand policy, to see if 
they enhance our appreciation of the aggregate transmission mechanism relationships Such studies include 
Ganley and Salmon (1996), Dale and Haldane (1995), and Gertler and Grilchrist (1994). This study attempts 
to use similar approach and compare the response of real aggregate and sectoral outputs to an unexpected 
policy change in a small open developing Nigerian economy. In addition, the role of interactive effects of 
economic openness and real oil price shock were also investigated. Separate VARs was estimated for each of 
the identified output measures and compare the effect of a policy shock on each sectoral output measure and 
use the Impulse Response Function (IRF) and Variance Decomposition (VD) estimates generated from the 
VARs as the basis. The focus is principally on the size and timing of the impact of oil price and the other 
macroeconomic variables on real output fluctuations. These key characteristics of the transmission mechanism 
provide valuable information the effectiveness of policy in stimulating real; growth. The size of response in each 
sector indicates how the impact of unanticipated changes aggregate demand and supply shock are distributed 
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across the economy; while the timing of these responses suggests how long the ‘real’ effects of the policy 
innovation may persist. In addition the impulse responses were explained in term of the degree of economic 
openness. The interplay of the policy shock response with the degree of economic openness provides some 
evidence on the relative importance economic liberalization on the transmission mechanism of macroeconomic 
policy in Nigeria.  Apart from this introduction, the paper is divided into four other sections. Section two 
provides a brief and concise review of some related studies while section three discusses the methodological 
approach adopted in analysis the dynamic response of real output to policy shocks. Section four is devoted to 
empirical analysis and section five concluded with policy implications. 
  
2. Review of Related Studies 
 
Sim (1980) seminal paper pioneered this approach by using VAR methodology to examine macro-policy-
output interactions. He employed impulse response functions to analyze the effects of each endogenous 
variable’s responses to unanticipated policy shocks. He found that unanticipated monetary policy shocks had 
significant effects on real output.   In order to check the robustness of Sim (1980) results, Stock and Watson 
(1989) re-examined the output effects of unanticipated policy using both three (output, prices, and money) 
and four (output, prices, money, and interest rates) variable using Sims’ VAR systems.  The findings of this 
study revealed that that unanticipated changes in money growth had statistically significant but marginal 
predictive value for industrial production. Friedman and Kuttner (1992) also found that evidence based on 
the most recent U.S. experience did not indicate a close or reliable relationship between money and non-
financial economic activity. Similarly Gauger and Enders (1989) classified the real output into aggregate and sub 
sectoral (disaggregate level) output in the US economy to investigate the possible different effects monetary 
policy could have on the different sectors of the US economy. They found no strong evidence in support of 
differential real effects of monetary policy; indeed their conclusion was that the impact of monetary policy was 
statistically insignificant in most of the sectors. 
  
On the implication of degree of economic openness on the effectiveness of monetary policy, Romer (1993) 
investigated the relationship between openness and inflation. He argued that the absence of pre-commitment 
to monetary policy led to inefficiently high inflation. He claimed that the less open economy would have a 
greater incentive to expand and so had a higher equilibrium inflation rate. This relation could be explained as 
thus: unanticipated monetary expansion caused real exchange rate depreciation and since more open 
economies were more vulnerable to the harms of real depreciation, then the benefits of unanticipated 
expansion tended to be negatively correlated with the degree of openness. Therefore, if the money authority 
considered openness as an important state variable for the monetary policy, monetary authorities in more 
open economies would on average expanded money supply less and would have lower average rates of 
inflation. Dennis (2001) argued also that the well-known result of depreciation of domestic exchange rate 
was increasing inflation. Dennis concluded that whether the money authority intervenes or not opening the 
economy to external influence led to absence of pre-commitment in monetary policy. So output expansion 
was less but inflation. Bryant, et al (1988), in their empirical study by more than 10 macro-econometric 
models, predicted that monetary expansion raised output and the price level while a contraction had the 
opposite effects.  Karras (1999a) and Guncavdi and Kucukcifci (2001) confirmed the same theory.  Burement 
and Dogan (2001) assessed whether the increasing degree of openness affected the effectiveness of the 
monetary policy for an open economy. Quarterly data from 1987:1 up to 2001:1 period for Turkey was used 
to estimate the relationship between openness and the effects of monetary policy on output and prices. The 
measure of openness was interacted with the monetary policy measures to examine the implication of 
openness on the effects of monetary policy. The findings supported the theoretical expectation that ‘monetary 
expansion reduces output growth substantially in a small open economy. This result buttressed the Romer’s 
(1993) findings, which demonstrated a negative relationship between monetary policy and the degree of 
openness.  
 
Blanchard and Gali (2007) investigated the effects of oil price shocks on a set of macroeconomic variables 
from a group of industrialized economies in the aftermath of the oil price shocks of the 1970s and of the last 
decade, focusing on the differences across episodes. The paper examined four different hypotheses for the 
mild effects on inflation and economic activity of the recent increase in the price of oil: (a) good luck (i.e. lack 
of concurrent adverse shocks), (b) smaller share of oil in production, (c) more flexible labor markets, and (d) 
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improvements in monetary policy. The paper concluded that all the four scenarios have played an important 
role in influencing the macroeconomic performance. While an array of studies has been conducted on other 
countries less attempted was made with respect to Nigeria. In view of the reliance of Nigerian government on 
macroeconomic policy as instrument to stimulate output and stabilize prices, it is crucial to examine the 
efficacy of such policy thrust amidst the simultaneous liberalization of the Nigerian economy. 
 
3. Empirical Methodology 
 
A five variable cointegrating VAR is specified, interpreting each system as an unrestricted vector error correction 
model. To identify the policy shocks the Choleski decomposition was used in line with Bernanke and Blinder 
(1992). As well known, this identification procedure is somewhat ad hoc and relies on recursive relationship 
existing between the data. Following Karras (1999a, b); and Apergis and Miller (1998), we included oil price 
shocks as a measure of supply shocks. No reason exists to assume that the aggregate supplies in the Nigerian 
economy over the sample period remained stable where competitive markets do not exist.  Our preferred 
ordering of the VARS is   
   
  X= Oilp, OP, FP, MP, Q, ……………………………………………1i 
 where  Oilp represents International Oil price indices., 
  OP, is the measure of economic openness,  
  FP and MP are  fiscal  and monetary policy variables respectively 
  Q is the real output variable 
  
This ordering stems from both economic theory and orthogonality of structural innovations. The placement 
of external shock variables first is based on the fact that the external development is important to domestic 
economic conditions and indeed the small but open assumption of the Nigerian economy. Therefore, all 
external variables are assumed to influence country specific variables. None of the country specific variable is 
assumed to influence the external variables. Given the importance of oil in the Nigerian economy, oil price 
was included as a measure of supply shock in line with Karras (1999a, 1999b) and selected as the first 
variable, contemporaneously affecting all other variables. The second variable in the ordering is the openness 
(OP), which is also assumed to have contemporaneous effects on all other variables except the first. The 
placement of the policy variables of interest FP, MP next, is consistent with the familiar textbook treatment of 
aggregate supply and aggregate demand in which current period shocks to the policy variables can affect real 
output contemporaneously. 
 
Because our aim is to compare results across a series of VARS, we imposed common lags length of three on each 
of them. The choice of this lag length has the advantage of whitening the errors for the each of the  individual 
VARS and is consistent with the notion that the maximum effect of the macroeconomic policy on real output does 
not exceed 36 months to manifest itself in Nigeria1. An alternative approach is to calculate the optimal lag 
length for each VAR separately, and carry out analysis with differing lag lengths. But in this case, we may be 
unsure whether differences in the profile of real aggregate and sectoral output responses to policy shocks 
simply reflect differences in the lag lengths of each VAR   
 
Description and Sources 
 
Annual time series for the period between 1960 and 2003 are used to estimate the models specified. This 
period was specifically chosen to trace the effects policy before the advent of recent macroeconomic reforms 
that took place in Nigeria in 2004. The sources of data on each variable are stated explicitly below. All 
variables are collected from various editions of Statistical Bulletin published by Central bank of Nigeria. 
Output is proxied by GDP; two measures of fiscal and monetary policies are used in the analysis. Government 
expenditure and non oil revenue represents the fiscal policy while broad money supply and interest rate 
represents the monetary policy measures.  Openness is measure as the sum of non oil export and import as 
                                               
1 Olaloye AND Ikhide (1995) found out that the response lag in monetary and fiscal policy is between 24 and 36 months 
(two and three years).  
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ratio of GDP and oil price oil price is proxied by the naira equivalent of international oil price. That is the US 
Dollar Oil Price is converted using the appropriate exchange rate for each year. 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
The sources of changes in the growth rates of real outputs were examined through the computation of 
impulse response functions (IRFs) and variance decomposition (VDC), which in turn were based on the 
moving-average representation of the CVAR model. The variable were found to be integrated of order one 
and there was at least  one cointegration relationships among the variables thus permitting the estimation of 
the model with the multivariate cointegration mechanism The IRF indicated the direction and size of the 
effects of a one standard deviation shock to one variable on other variable in the system over time. The VDCs 
showed the percentage of the forecast error variance for each variable that might be attributed to its own 
innovations and to fluctuations in other variables in the system. Both the IRF and the VDC were used to 
determine the effectiveness and transmission mechanism of policy shocks in the system in line with standard 
practices.  
 
Impulse Response Function Analysis 
 
As earlier stated, the variables were ordered as: Real oil price, (OILP), Openness (OPEN), fiscal policy (FP1 
and FP2 for expenditure and non-oil revenue respectively), monetary policy (MP1 and MP2 for money supply 
and interest rate respectively), and the real output of interest as usually were aggregate output (Qgdp), 
industrial (Qind), manufacturing (Qman), service (Qserv), and agricultural output (Qagric). The placement of the oil 
price and openness variables first was based on the assumption that the Nigerian economy was characterized 
as a small open economy during the period of investigation so that current-period shocks to both openness 
and real oil price were allowed to influence domestic variables, but the domestic economy could not 
contemporaneously affect external variables. Odusola and Akinlo (2003) had argued that the interpretation 
of the impulse response function from VECM model should take into consideration the use of first 
differencing of the variables as well as the vector error correction estimates. Thus, a one-time shock to any of 
the first difference variable used in this study was a permanent shock to the level of that variable. This allows 
the determination of the impacts monetary and fiscal policy shocks as well as openness and oil price shocks 
on real outputs. Figure 1 depicted the impulse response functions of the variables mentioned above. The 
maximum value of IRFs represents the peak effect while the time horizon for the graph to decay gave the 
timing of the policy effect on real output. 
 
A cursory inspection of the impulse responses reported in Figure 1 showed that the real output effects of the 
policy; openness and real oil price innovations fluctuated, though with low amplitude but converged after 
some time to constant value as expected for any cointegrated series. Using the signs to draw economic 
meaning from the estimates and starting from the two non-policy variables, The signs indicated pervasive 
impacts of both oil price and openness shocks on real output across the sectors and time horizons. With 
respect to aggregate output, oil price shock had positive effects across the time horizons. Its effects ranged 
between 0.8 and 0.2 across the periods. Intuitively, this result suggests that a permanent shock to the oil price 
could result in a temporary positive impact on real economic growth, which declined progressively overtime. 
Openness shock impacts fluctuated across the period. It was negative in the in four out of the ten lag periods: 
2nd (-0.02), 3rd (-.0.2), 5th (-0.008) and the 10th (-0.02) lags. A further observation shows that the negative 
effects overwhelmed the positive impacts across the horizon, implying that openness had contractionary 
effects on the growth of real aggregate output.  
 
In terms of sectoral output responses, the industrial output responses remarkably differed from the other 
sectors’ responses to openness shocks. Industrial output responded positively at increasing rate to shocks 
from openness while the impacts of oil price had no explicitly discernible pattern. The observation that 
output responded more positively to openness shocks is worthy of note. These industrial output responses 
seemed contradictory to general opinion that the trade liberalization has affected the industrial production 
especially manufacturing sector adversely. The results reported here do not support this position. Perhaps, 
the trade liberalization had put the manufacturers on their toes. They had been forced to be more innovative, 
creative and proactively enterprising. The competition is now high and intense. Indeed, the effect of this 
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competition is really being felt in term of quality and productivity. This improved quality is more noticeable 
in the detergent, beverages, cosmetics and confectioneries industries where it is becoming more difficult to 
differentiate between the local and imported products. 
  
The effects of fiscal expansion on sectoral output growths were admixture of both positive and negative 
impacts but there was evidence of overwhelming positive effects over the negative effects in both fiscal 
expansion (expenditure growth i.e. FP1) and tightening (non oil revenue i.e., FP2). In sharp contrast to 
evidence from the fiscal policy propagation, monetary policy impacts on both aggregate and sectoral output 
were consistent with economic theory. The monetary expansion through money supply growth had positive 
impacts while the monetary policy tightening had negative impacts on real outputs. Interestingly, none of the 
money supply shocks had negative signs while interest rate policy shocks (MP2) also had negative signs in 
almost on all point estimates. One important observation that merit further elaboration was the net real 
effects of both fiscal and monetary policy expansion and contraction. A closer and deeper look at the point 
estimates across the output measures and time horizon revealed the relative adverse effects of the 
macroeconomic policy variables used on the analysis. Comparing the size of effects of fiscal expansion (FP1) 
to monetary policy expansion (MP1) showed that in the case of aggregate output, the negative effects of fiscal 
expansion overwhelmed positive effects from the monetary expansion across time horizons. 
 
Figure 1: The Plots of Impulse Response Functions of Real Output Growth to Policy and Openness 
shocks 
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Real Manufacturing Output  
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Real agricultural Output  
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Specifically and most especially, in the first three years, the net negative effects of fiscal policy over monetary 
policy; -3%, -1% and –1% were suggestive of futility of using fiscal policy as growth stimulant even with an 
offsetting monetary policy action. In the case of contraction policy, the effects of fiscal contraction, which 
promoted real output, overwhelmed the contracting effects of monetary policy tightening.  On the average, in 
the first three years also after the shock, the result showed that the real net effects of both fiscal and 
monetary tightening, instead of dampened, boosted aggregate demand by as much as 4%, 1% and 3% 
respectively. This was a clear evidence of macroeconomic (aggregate demand) policy ineffectiveness as tool 
for stimulating aggregate output in Nigeria. However, monetary policy seemed relatively effective than fiscal 
policy, it was not sufficient to offset the overriding negative effects of fiscal policy impulses.  
 
The net effects of the policy shock on sectoral output also deserved attention. In contrast to the aggregate 
output response, the positive effects on monetary expansion overwhelmed the negative effects of fiscal 
expansion while in similar manner the negative effect monetary policy tightening overwhelmed the positive 
effects of fiscal expansion in those cases when the fiscal policy were positives. Specifically sectoral output 
response to net policy expansion was positive and substantial. For instance, in the first three years after the 
shock, the net effects were 0.06, 0.03 and 0.01 for industrial output, manufacturing; 10%, 2%, 6% 
respectively. The corresponding net effects were 3%, 5%, 7% and 5%, 1%, 7% for service and agricultural 
outputs respectively. The net effects of policy contraction were also in favor of monetary policy when fiscal 
policy was positive across sectors and time horizons. Several other studies on the Nigerian economy had also 
previously confirmed the relative effectiveness of monetary policy over the fiscal policy such studies among 
them were Ajisafe and Folorunso (2001) and Asogu (1998). 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
 
The robustness of the result to economic openness interaction with policy effect was also examined. The 
interactive openness/ policy variable was used to replace the policy variable in the baseline model and 
openness variable was excluded to completely isolate its possible influence on the effect of the interactive 
term2. The output responses to policy innovation differed from the model earlier analyzed where the policy 
and openness variables entered independently. Contrary to observed patterns reported in the prior model, in 
nearly all the cases, both expansionary fiscal and monetary policy shocks had positive effects in almost all the 
lags. Both fiscal and monetary contraction remained unaffected by the interaction of policy with openness. 
The non-oil revenue shocks’ effect remained positive while interest rate policy shocks had negative effects as 
before. 
 
Timing and Sizes of Real Output Responses to Policy Impulses 
 
One of the main issues of interest was how long did it take real output to adjust after the initial policy shocks. 
Table 1 summarizes the maximum size and timing of these peak effects on real output growth. As results in 
Table 1 show, expansionary monetary policy not only has shorter lags in most cases than fiscal policy, its 
sizes were substantially larger than fiscal policy effects. Similar patterns were evident in the contractionary 
policy as well. Except in aggregate and industrial output, the maximum output reduction occasioned by policy 
tightening was larger and occurred at shorted lag in monetary policy than fiscal policy. Apart from industrial 
output the maximum reduction in real sectoral output occurred in the first year and decline progressively 
afterwards.  The lower part of Table 1 showed the corresponding values and time lag for the interactive 
policy/openness variables. The aggregate output responded to both expansionary and contractionary policy 
differed in terms of sizes and timing. The sizes of the expansionary policy effects were higher and the timing 
was shorter. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
2 The results of the interactive model were not presented to preserve space. It is available on request from the author 
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Table 1: Time lags and Sizes of Real Output Responses to Policy Impulses 
Output 
measures 
Maximum output responses to 
Expansionary Policy 
Minimum output responses to contractionary 
policy  
Fiscal  Monetary  Fiscal  Monetary  
Size 
(%) 
Time  
Lag 
Size  
(%) 
Time 
Lag 
Size 
(%) 
Time 
 Lag 
Size 
(%)  
Time  
Lag 
Qgdp -2.4 7 3.6 8 1.6 9 -3 10 
Qind 1.5 3 9.1 2 -5.7 1 -3 8 
Qman 2.1 7 10.1 4 2.3 5 -2.0 1 
Qserv 3.0 3 5.2 3 -0.1 9 -4.2 1 
Qagric 3.5 3 1.0 8 2.4 5 -7.0 1 
 Model with interactive Openness/Policy terms 
Qgdp 5.6 4 3.2 1 2.1 3 -5.7 1 
Qind 7.7 4 12.0 1 -2.8 3 -4.3 5 
Qman 0.1 3 -5.5 3 -3.7 5 -8.4 1 
Qserv 3.4 3 4.3 1 -0.4 5 -8.6 1 
Qagric 0.6 3 3.5 1 -2.7 3 -8.6 1 
 
Variance Decomposition of Real Outputs Growth rates  
 
The variance decomposition of shock response of the output growth elicited the relative contribution of each 
variables in the system to the variation in real output growth. Thus, indicating the strength and weakness of 
the policy variables in stimulating real output: an indirect test of policy ineffectiveness proposition. This 
information was obtained by computing variance decomposition (VDCs) of real output (Q) explained by 
monetary, fiscal openness and real oil price variables.  The VDCs at time horizons of 10 years were shown in 
order to convey sense of the dynamics of the system. Only the effects on real outputs were shown in order to 
focus upon the variables of central interest to this study and to conserve space. Each partition in table 2 
represented estimates for each measure of real output used in the model.  
 
Table 2 shows that ‘own shocks’ explained substantial proportion in aggregate, manufacturing and 
agricultural output fluctuations. In contrast, ‘oil price shocks constituted the predominant sources of 
variation in industrial output while non oil revenue (FP2) dominated the fluctuation in service output. The 
role of other macroeconomic variables differed across output measures. For instance, variation in aggregate 
output was explained largely by past innovation in oil price (OILP), government expenditure (FP1), and partly 
by non-oil revenue (FP2) changes. Specifically, the proportion explained by oil price changes declined 
progressively from 35% in the first year after the shock to 23% in the 9th year while variation due to 
expenditure ranged from 21% in the 2nd year after the shock to 16% in the 10th year. Monetary policy and 
openness were found to be less relevant in explaining variations in real output.  The proportion of variation in 
output explained by the monetary policy was in most cases less than 10% whereas fiscal policy explained 
above 20%. Openness shock could not account for more that 5% of variations in real aggregate output across 
the time horizons.   
 
In terms of proportion of sectoral output variation explained by the variables, oil price and money supply 
ranked first and second in explaining variation in most of the sectoral output fluctuations. Variation in 
industrial sector production could be attributed to innovation to money supply (MP1) shocks, openness and 
oil price changes. Less proportion (1%) of changes in industrial production related to changes in interest rate, 
5% by non-oil revenue and 10% by government expenditure shocks. This was in sharp contrast to aggregate 
output where none of the two monetary policy innovations accounted for any significant changes in the 
aggregate output fluctuation. Fiscal policy seemed less effective while monetary policy was more relevant in 
determining fluctuation in industrial sector growth. The manufacturing sector variation was not significantly 
different from the results in the industrial sector, except the deterioration in openness performance. The 
openness contribution to manufacturing output growth fell further, it explained less than 3% and indeed 
contributed insignificantly  (0.02%) to variation in manufacturing output in the first year. Oil price remained 
significant determinant of real manufacturing output fluctuations, it accounted for more than 30% of the 
variation through the periods. Money supply shocks were remarkably important in the manufacturing output 
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fluctuation while fiscal policy contribution was negligible especially, government expenditure shocks. Interest 
rate was also found to be less relevant in determining the manufacturing output fluctuation. In most periods, 
it explained less than 2% as against 25% attributed to money supply and 12 % that was explained by non-oil 
revenue.  
 
The performance of service sector was also note worthy. In contrast to industrial and manufacturing sector 
performance, non-oil revenue shocks were found to be the main determinant of variation of service output 
growth.  Government expenditure contribution was less than 6% in the entire horizon and was relatively nil 
(0.00) in the first year. Both money supply and interest rate accounted for little variation in service output, 
hardly was there a period the percent contributed was more that 10% for interest rate and 16% for money 
supply. The variation in agricultural output seemed evenly distributed among the variables, apart from own 
shock which explained the largest proportion (33% in the first year) and the expenditure (FP1), which 
explained the least 0.2%, oil, price, openness and the two monetary policy shocks explained relatively equal 
proportion of about 20%. However, money supply ranks first among the paired, with about 24% in the later 
periods. In summary, an oil price shock was found to be the main determinant on all the output growth, 
openness was only significant contributor in industrial output. The contribution of the two macroeconomic 
policy shocks was also different. Money supply ranked second to oil price, as the main macroeconomic 
determinant of fluctuation in real output. In contrast, government expenditure contributed significantly only 
to aggregate output. Interest rate performance was not impressive while non-oil revenue was a major 
determinant of both aggregate and sectoral output fluctuations. Therefore apart from oil price money supply 
and non-oil revenue were the main macroeconomic determinants of fluctuation in real output growth in 
Nigeria.  
 
Sensitivity analysis of the robustness of the estimates to openness interactive effect on the real output 
response to policy shocks was also conducted on VDC estimations3. Incorporating the interactive terms into 
the model significantly altered the relationships among the variables most especially the contributions of the 
macroeconomic policy shocks. In contrast to the preceding results, government non oil revenue shocks that 
could not explain more than 19% and openness which also explained less than 5%, now jointly explained 
more than 40% in the first two years and about 30% in the subsequent years of aggregate output fluctuation. 
Similar pattern was observed in the interest rate/openness variable. However, its performance in the service 
sector deteriorated as less proportion of changes in real output was accounted by changes in interest rate. 
Moreover, Interest, which also had less than 5% explanatory power, now accounted for about 20% when 
combined with openness in the aggregate output equation. An interesting finding from these results was the 
confirmation of the significant role that openness plays in the effectiveness of both monetary and fiscal policy. 
For instance, all the IRFs estimates for both monetary and fiscal policies changed when interacted with 
openness. This implied that openness was a key factor in the determining the efficacy of macroeconomic 
policy in Nigeria. Consistently, the results appeared to be consistent with the aggregate demand channel: a 
rise in money supply due to increased fiscal and monetary expansion would result in exchange rate 
depreciation and price increase. This increase in price would cause increased cost of production and hence 
subsequently fall in the output level. Furthermore, the observed adverse effects of openness on monetary and 
fiscal policy effectiveness were consistent also with the findings of Romer (1993), Lane (1997) Terra (1998) 
and Karras (199a, b).  
 
However, the overwhelming negative effects of openness shock did not appear in general to support the new 
growth theories that increasing openness would help the domestic economy to grow. The results also 
appeared to be at odds with the empirical findings of Ekpo (1995) and Oladipo (1998), and Olomola (2001) 
for the Nigerian economy. However, the result conformed to short run negative effects found by Saibu (2004), 
Aitken and Harrison (1999) in line with the theoretical argument of Levine and Renelt (1992). The theoretical 
argument is that that trade liberalization of a developing country whose economic fundamentals are not very 
strong may discourage domestic investment due to increased international competition, and its decrease 
would be greater than capital inflows from abroad. In this case, net investment fell as did aggregate demand. 
Therefore, increasing openness had negative effects on the growth rates of output. 
                                               
3 Variance decomposition table for the interactive model was not included due to space , they are available on 
request fro the author 
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Table 2: The Variance Decomposition of Real Output Innovation 
 
 Period Q OILP OPEN FP1 FP2 MP1 MP2 
A
gg
re
ga
te
 O
u
tp
u
t 
Q
gd
p
 
 1  21.85490  35.51834  4.061640  18.52952  12.64293  5.830393  1.562274 
 2  20.20749  29.68484  3.900270  21.51848  12.78456  8.439508  3.464850 
 3  18.21986  28.85910  4.319046  18.86590  16.87967  9.012740  3.843680 
 4  19.33521  25.67473  5.826167  18.24253  16.26503  9.380128  5.276202 
 5  20.55436  24.24532  5.425362  18.73718  15.42414  8.972502  6.641134 
 6  21.31355  26.38653  5.100480  17.37636  15.23250  7.938173  6.652410 
 7  20.19458  24.69306  4.741118  16.75518  19.35981  8.210506  6.045738 
 8  18.73977  23.57934  5.070481  17.34714  19.14857  9.423308  6.691389 
 9  20.55626  23.27617  4.731582  16.91461  18.08336  9.250282  7.187737 
 10  20.78925  25.07354  4.465312  16.45613  17.35657  8.575637  7.283563 
In
d
u
st
ri
al
 O
u
tp
u
t 
 Q
in
d
 
 1  8.015017  35.81105  17.12645  6.288381  6.738611  25.55487  0.465633 
 2  7.380605  27.61455  16.05165  10.53487  5.236231  32.75402  0.428067 
 3  7.483386  25.27086  21.21441  9.644271  6.024550  29.94854  0.413974 
 4  7.944539  20.35262  26.93308  10.15808  4.898308  29.16389  0.549478 
 5  9.061657  18.96776  27.82304  10.67922  5.233550  27.27740  0.957377 
 6  9.663916  17.46388  30.32492  9.481239  5.175773  27.05078  0.839490 
 7  9.576585  17.50173  29.71515  9.686734  6.195408  26.43653  0.887865 
 8  9.452579  16.14140  32.11529  9.219210  5.794758  25.79953  1.477224 
 9  10.03360  14.84648  34.33393  8.943892  5.744885  24.74834  1.348883 
 10  10.51335  16.51247  32.76516  9.251262  5.503385  24.18326  1.271118 
M
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g 
o
u
tp
u
t 
Q
m
an
 
 1  33.49169  31.43483  0.227983  0.505816  10.40020  21.76592  2.173557 
 2  27.24280  37.21609  1.728563  1.036528  12.66955  17.79087  2.315588 
 3  26.83457  36.82930  1.839433  2.941228  13.08249  16.06388  2.409103 
 4  27.38497  28.56934  1.513425  2.258456  12.90300  25.46801  1.902799 
 5  26.76493  29.26823  3.308565  2.381427  11.35755  25.08542  1.833889 
 6  24.75756  32.31244  2.817978  2.101112  12.63178  23.84307  1.536060 
 7  23.98424  33.65618  2.821092  2.271545  12.54222  23.26708  1.457641 
 8  25.82994  30.88939  2.555671  2.063520  12.33985  25.00036  1.321275 
 9  26.26696  30.05537  2.864996  1.919713  12.44393  25.11343  1.335604 
 10  25.13141  31.41485  2.821144  1.830405  12.34070  25.24151  1.219978 
Se
rv
ic
e 
O
u
tp
u
t 
Q
se
rv
 
 1  12.83196  12.35811  0.032523  0.002028  59.58185  5.759716  9.433816 
 2  9.730947  17.06252  3.988303  3.147734  45.53106  8.641563  11.89786 
 3  8.037656  14.69064  7.855417  5.630457  40.59407  13.50067  9.691091 
 4  7.477603  15.78648  7.342023  5.424239  37.49080  16.47714  10.00171 
 5  8.809305  15.82252  8.772523  5.091670  34.85072  15.41197  11.24130 
 6  8.958532  18.81777  7.001140  4.118637  37.66751  12.97067  10.46575 
 7  8.371871  17.62769  8.309300  3.861656  39.69104  12.43558  9.702863 
 8  7.797125  16.68461  7.775672  3.675935  38.44755  16.23942  9.379692 
 9  7.505272  17.11132  8.338100  5.017702  36.08160  16.08887  9.857144 
 10  7.630631  20.15820  8.292007  4.619458  33.81864  15.27553  10.20554 
A
gr
ic
u
lt
u
ra
l O
u
tp
u
t 
Q
ag
ri
c  
 1  33.01346  16.42635  11.83337  0.164900  9.626995  10.24786  18.68707 
 2  28.85875  19.35507  10.99427  0.788904  15.00565  8.852501  16.14486 
 3  22.90037  17.31302  13.53729  3.865392  16.64850  12.66418  13.07125 
 4  21.04354  14.84295  11.76442  3.249687  17.72242  19.08584  12.29114 
 5  20.25293  14.64041  11.92221  3.905291  17.23168  20.00947  12.03802 
 6  19.28197  17.22897  11.67842  3.485075  18.59424  18.82694  10.90439 
 7  17.92317  16.68075  10.75643  3.434684  22.15479  19.01684  10.03333 
 8  16.02860  15.40328  9.629943  3.060825  22.86010  23.70356  9.313696 
 9  15.86828  14.94823  8.978582  2.844341  23.05963  24.95031  9.350626 
 10  15.03793  17.07517  8.170333  2.727829  23.59312  24.32288  9.072740 
 Ordering: OILP OPEN FP1 FP2 MP1 MP2 Q 
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5. Policy Implication and Conclusion 
 
In summary, an oil price shock was found to be the main determinant on all the output growth, openness was 
only significant contributor in industrial output. The contribution of the two macroeconomic policy shocks 
was also different. Money supply ranked second to oil price, as the main macroeconomic determinant of 
fluctuation in real output. In contrast, government expenditure contributed significantly only to aggregate 
output. Interest rate performance was not impressive while non-oil revenue was a major determinant of both 
aggregate and sectoral output fluctuations. Therefore apart from oil price, money supply and non-oil revenue 
were the main macroeconomic determinants of fluctuation in real output growth in Nigeria. However, the fact 
that against expectation, the expansionary policy shocks adversely affected real output while contractionary 
policy shocks boosted aggregate demand confirmed the irrelevance of macroeconomic policy as the veritable 
tool for stimulating real growth in Nigeria. Moreover, in terms of timing of the policy impacts, monetary 
policy shocks not only had shorter lags than fiscal policy shocks, its sizes were substantially larger. Monetary 
policy shocks had short run effects on output than the fiscal policy shocks, implying that fiscal policy had 
longer response lag than monetary policy in Nigeria.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The general conclusion  from these findings was that, expansionary policy through increased government 
spending did not have the same effects as increasing money supply, while money supply increases aggregate 
spending, increased government spending crowd out private spending, hence less effective in boosting 
aggregate demand in Nigeria. Similarly, tight monetary policy through increase interest rate did not have the 
same effect as increasing the tax rate and other personal income reduction strategies, hence could not be use 
also as a means of curtailing aggregate spending. The negative consequences of monetary and fiscal policies 
in significantly affecting real output growth in Nigeria means that the behavior of real output was varied 
under alternative fiscal and monetary policy mix. The major growth determinant factors observed in this 
study were international oil price changes and trade openness. Thus, fluctuations in real output in Nigeria 
were externally induced. The degree of openness, which was found to have adverse effect on policy 
ineffectiveness and the asymmetry in policy effects made relying on macroeconomic policy to be less 
attractive.  
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